MODE
发表于 2025-3-30 10:52:41
978-3-642-16169-8Springer-Verlag Heidelberg 2010
LUMEN
发表于 2025-3-30 13:58:35
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星星
发表于 2025-3-30 16:41:37
Lukas Schriewer,Daniel Reichertfeasible points is a polyhedral convex set while the cost function is non-linear; however, unlike that, the optimum is always attained at a vertex of this polytope. The convex cost function depends only on the initial endowments of the buyers. This formulation yields an easy simplex-like pivoting al
使尴尬
发表于 2025-3-30 22:37:06
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Gastric
发表于 2025-3-31 04:09:05
Jonas Esch,Andrea Rettmann,Sabine Marzineakto change their strategies collectively, does not always exist in such games. We show, however, that partition equilibrium (introduced in to model coalitions arising in a social context) always exists in general resource selection games, as well as how to compute it efficiently. In a partition e
小说
发表于 2025-3-31 05:27:51
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-90948-1st-response dynamics where the noise level is tuned by a parameter .. Such a dynamics defines a family of ergodic Markov chains, indexed by ., over the set of strategy profiles. Our aim is twofold: On the one hand, we are interested in the expected social welfare when the strategy profiles are rando
Defense
发表于 2025-3-31 11:18:11
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努力赶上
发表于 2025-3-31 16:21:54
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-04172-2quilibria that are far apart, or .-equilibria that are far in variation distance from the true Nash equilibrium strategies, then this prediction may not be possible even in principle. Motivated by this consideration, in this paper we define the notion of games that are ., meaning that all .-approxim
遵循的规范
发表于 2025-3-31 19:17:13
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Merited
发表于 2025-3-31 22:17:14
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