osteopath 发表于 2025-3-25 07:21:12

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要控制 发表于 2025-3-25 07:37:46

The Declining Price Anomaly Is Not Universal in Multi-buyer Sequential Auctions (But Almost Is)en observed in a plethora of practical applications. On the theoretical side, Gale and Stegeman [.] proved that the anomaly is guaranteed to hold in full information sequential auctions with exactly two buyers. We prove that the declining price anomaly is . guaranteed in full information sequential

加强防卫 发表于 2025-3-25 14:11:06

Risk-Free Bidding in Complement-Free Combinatorial Auctionse (subadditive) bidder can guarantee in an auction against individually rational bidders? Suppose there are . bidders and . is the value bidder . has for the entire set of items. We study the above problem from the perspective of the first bidder, Bidder 1. In this setting, the worst case profit gua

有恶意 发表于 2025-3-25 18:48:06

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松软 发表于 2025-3-25 21:54:55

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Seminar 发表于 2025-3-26 00:37:08

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爱哭 发表于 2025-3-26 07:21:00

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FICE 发表于 2025-3-26 11:48:10

The Online Best Reply Algorithm for Resource Allocation Problemsn problem, we are given a set of resources and a set of requests that arrive in an online manner. Each request consists of a set of feasible allocations and an allocation is a set of resources. The total cost of an allocation vector is given by the sum of the resources’ costs, where each resource’s

奇思怪想 发表于 2025-3-26 16:42:32

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分开如此和谐 发表于 2025-3-26 18:37:43

Algorithmic Game Theory978-3-030-30473-7Series ISSN 0302-9743 Series E-ISSN 1611-3349
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查看完整版本: Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; 12th International S Dimitris Fotakis,Evangelos Markakis Conference proceedings 2019 Springer Nature Switzerland A