Toxoid-Vaccines
发表于 2025-3-26 23:22:33
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SNEER
发表于 2025-3-27 02:35:39
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VALID
发表于 2025-3-27 06:52:34
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IST
发表于 2025-3-27 12:01:14
Financial Networks with Singleton Liability Prioritiesf the literature. The main computational challenge in this context is the clearing problem, a fixed point search problem that essentially determines insolvent firms and their exposure to systemic risk, technically known as recovery rates. When Credit Default Swaps, a derivative connected to the 2008
projectile
发表于 2025-3-27 15:32:16
Automated Equilibrium Analysis of , Gamesials, which makes it challenging to compute. This paper presents an algorithm that computes this set for the simplest game with more than two players with arbitrary (possibly non-generic) payoffs, which has not been done before. We give new elegant formulas for completely mixed equilibria, and compu
粘
发表于 2025-3-27 19:55:21
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MITE
发表于 2025-3-28 00:47:50
A Common Generalization of Budget Games and Congestion Gameslems. Budget games have several similarities to congestion games, one of which is that the matroid structure of the strategy space is essential for the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE). Despite these similarities, however, the theoretical relation between budget games and congestion games
ANN
发表于 2025-3-28 05:07:06
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Prognosis
发表于 2025-3-28 10:10:23
Greater Flexibility in Mechanism Design Through Altruisms that can redistribute the payments among the players. Also here, it turns out that altruism has a positive effect in the sense that the payments needed to guarantee truthfulness can be further reduced..Finally, we illustrate our theoretical results by applying them to well-studied mechanism design
ACTIN
发表于 2025-3-28 12:48:02
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