Modify
发表于 2025-3-26 23:31:20
http://reply.papertrans.cn/16/1512/151169/151169_31.png
mighty
发表于 2025-3-27 02:57:50
Mechanism for Optimally Trading Off Revenue and Efficiency in Multi-unit Auctionsnt strategy auction mechanism that maximizes expected social welfare subject to a minimum constraint on the seller’s expected utility. This way the seller can maximize social welfare subject to doing well enough for himself.
Repatriate
发表于 2025-3-27 06:25:42
Choosing Samples to Compute Heuristic-Strategy Nash Equilibriummputed Nash equilibrium as samples are performed at faster rates than naive uniform sampling. The second, faster method, has a lower metadeliberation cost and better scaling properties. We discuss how our sampling methodology could be used within . mechanism design.
Vertical
发表于 2025-3-27 09:26:28
Improving Learning Performance by Applying Economic Knowledgen this solution. We show how a modest amount of economic knowledge about the problem can make it much easier, either by reducing the search space, starting in a useful area of the space, or introducing a gradient. These experiments support the hypothesis that a producer using some knowledge of a pro
PSA-velocity
发表于 2025-3-27 15:06:47
Cuba and Western Intellectuals since 1959ese Pareto search strategies will result in very efficient bargaining outcomes. Moreover, the system is set up such that it is actually in the best interest of the customer to have their agent adhere to this approach of disentangling the bargaining strategy.
比赛用背带
发表于 2025-3-27 18:18:54
Cuba and Western Intellectuals since 1959the rise and sell when it’s on the decline, but the second agent does exactly the opposite. As a result, we call it the . strategy. The strategies used by both agents are adapted for automated trading. Both agents performed well in a PLAT live competition. In this paper, we analyze the performance o
遭遇
发表于 2025-3-28 01:00:01
Cuba and Western Intellectuals since 1959cted utility increases, and becomes increasingly (but not monotonically) more competitive with Myerson’s expected utility maximizing auction. Myerson’s uses full valuation revelation and is arguably impractical because its rules are unintuitive, unlike ours.
Confidential
发表于 2025-3-28 04:43:57
Nicolás Prados Ortiz de Solórzanont strategy auction mechanism that maximizes expected social welfare subject to a minimum constraint on the seller’s expected utility. This way the seller can maximize social welfare subject to doing well enough for himself.
hermitage
发表于 2025-3-28 06:22:59
http://reply.papertrans.cn/16/1512/151169/151169_39.png
蘑菇
发表于 2025-3-28 12:56:30
Obstacles to Breaking the US—Cuban Deadlockn this solution. We show how a modest amount of economic knowledge about the problem can make it much easier, either by reducing the search space, starting in a useful area of the space, or introducing a gradient. These experiments support the hypothesis that a producer using some knowledge of a pro