Herpetologist
发表于 2025-3-27 00:25:45
Design of an Optimal Frequency Reward Program in the Face of Competition,rational economic terms. We assume two kinds of customers: myopic and strategic [.]. Every customer has a prior loyalty bias [.] toward the reward program merchant, a parameter drawn from a known distribution, indicating an additional probability of choosing the reward program merchant over the trad
否认
发表于 2025-3-27 02:02:18
http://reply.papertrans.cn/103/10217/1021694/1021694_32.png
commute
发表于 2025-3-27 09:07:53
Design of an Optimal Frequency Reward Program in the Face of Competition,rational economic terms. We assume two kinds of customers: myopic and strategic [.]. Every customer has a prior loyalty bias [.] toward the reward program merchant, a parameter drawn from a known distribution, indicating an additional probability of choosing the reward program merchant over the trad
戏法
发表于 2025-3-27 11:59:16
A Characterization of Undirected Graphs Admitting Optimal Cost Shares,ash equilibrium of an induced cost-sharing game. One of the most intriguing open problems to date is to understand the power of budget-balanced and separable cost sharing protocols in order to induce low-cost Steiner forests..In this work, we focus on . networks and analyze topological properties of
GEST
发表于 2025-3-27 16:02:01
http://reply.papertrans.cn/103/10217/1021694/1021694_35.png
红润
发表于 2025-3-27 18:46:01
Routing Games over Time with FIFO Policy,up in a . queue and may wait: an edge is associated with a capacity, which defines how many agents-per-time-step can pop from the queue’s head and enter the edge, to transit for a fixed delay. We show that the best-response optimization problem is not approximable, and that deciding the existence of
Popcorn
发表于 2025-3-28 00:13:38
Approximate Efficiency in Matching Markets,ely efficient if there is no alternate lottery in which each agent’s ex-ante expected utility increases by an . factor. A mechanism is .-approximately efficient if every lottery produced in equilibrium is .-approximately efficient. We argue this is the natural extension of approximate efficiency in
GENRE
发表于 2025-3-28 03:00:30
http://reply.papertrans.cn/103/10217/1021694/1021694_38.png
Notify
发表于 2025-3-28 09:05:24
http://reply.papertrans.cn/103/10217/1021694/1021694_39.png
佛刊
发表于 2025-3-28 11:24:20
,Limiting User’s Sybil Attack in Resource Sharing,re than . times of their original share from the market equilibrium solution, by characterizing the worst case under which strategic agent can obtain the maximum utility gain after manipulation. On the other hand, such a bound of . is proved to be tight by constructing a proper instance, for which this bound is reached.