inchoate 发表于 2025-4-1 05:51:10
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Designing Markets for Daily Deals,y (the consumer), despite the asymmetry of information about this consumer benefit. We design auctions that truthfully elicit this information from the merchants and maximize the social welfare objective, and we characterize the consumer welfare functions for which this objective is truthfully imple伴随而来 发表于 2025-4-1 11:43:46
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The Price of Anarchy of the Proportional Allocation Mechanism Revisited, precisely the same geometric quantity. We also present a new variational inequality characterization of Nash equilibria in this setting, which enables us to extend the price-of-anarchy analysis to important classes of utility functions that are not necessarily concave.FLAT 发表于 2025-4-1 19:01:27
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Limits of Efficiency in Sequential Auctions,ns with gross substitute valuations, capacitated valuations, budget-additive valuations, and additive valuations with hard budget constraints on the payments. For capacitated valuations, our results imply a lower bound that equals the maximum capacity of any bidder, which is tight following the uppefidelity 发表于 2025-4-2 07:38:42
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Truthfulness Flooded Domains and the Power of Verification for Mechanism Design,ng whether truthful implementation can take advantage of any symmetric verification scheme in any domain. Since the simplest case of symmetric verification is local verification, our results imply, as a special case, the equivalence of local truthfulness and global truthfulness in the setting withou