思考而得
发表于 2025-3-26 21:51:37
On the Convergence of Swap Dynamics to Pareto-Optimal Matchingsr housing markets, marriage markets, and roommate markets as well as three different notions of swap rationality. Our main results are as follows. While it can be efficiently determined whether a Pareto-optimal stable matching can be reached when defining swaps via blocking pairs, checking whether t
脱落
发表于 2025-3-27 04:14:47
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瘙痒
发表于 2025-3-27 05:40:54
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Facilities
发表于 2025-3-27 12:40:45
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的’
发表于 2025-3-27 14:06:13
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Pituitary-Gland
发表于 2025-3-27 20:56:15
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简洁
发表于 2025-3-28 00:43:04
Persuasion and Incentives Through the Lens of Dualityacterizations of optimal and approximately optimal mechanisms. This paper applies this same methodology to a close cousin of traditional mechanism design, one which shares conceptual and technical elements with its more mature relative: the burgeoning field of persuasion. The dual perspective permit
群居男女
发表于 2025-3-28 02:16:01
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露天历史剧
发表于 2025-3-28 08:38:19
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恭维
发表于 2025-3-28 13:12:14
Convergence and Hardness of Strategic Schelling Segregationgent is content with her location if the fraction of her neighbors which have the same type as her is at least ., for some .. Discontent agents simply swap their location with a randomly chosen other discontent agent or jump to a random empty cell..We analyze a generalized game-theoretic model of Sc