QUAIL 发表于 2025-4-2 22:26:21

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灾难 发表于 2025-4-3 02:44:37

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异端邪说2 发表于 2025-4-3 05:17:31

Two Strongly Truthful Mechanisms for Three Heterogeneous Agents Answering One Questiongnals..Our proof technique is straightforward, conceptually motivated, and turns on the logarithmic scoring rule’s special properties..Moreover, we can recast the Bayesian Truth Serum mechanism [.] into our framework. We can also extend our results to the setting of . with a slightly weaker guarantee on the optimality of the truthful equilibrium.

jettison 发表于 2025-4-3 09:09:26

Two Strongly Truthful Mechanisms for Three Heterogeneous Agents Answering One Questiongnals..Our proof technique is straightforward, conceptually motivated, and turns on the logarithmic scoring rule’s special properties..Moreover, we can recast the Bayesian Truth Serum mechanism [.] into our framework. We can also extend our results to the setting of . with a slightly weaker guarantee on the optimality of the truthful equilibrium.

认为 发表于 2025-4-3 13:40:28

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查看完整版本: Titlebook: Web and Internet Economics; 16th International C Xujin Chen,Nikolai Gravin,Ruta Mehta Conference proceedings 2020 Springer Nature Switzerla