残废的火焰 发表于 2025-3-30 08:52:56
http://reply.papertrans.cn/103/10217/1021686/1021686_51.png秘传 发表于 2025-3-30 14:50:50
Incentives and Coordination in Bottleneck Modelsme-first-served observable queue. Agents dislike standing in line and they take actions in discrete time steps: we assume that each agent has a cost of 1 for every time step he waits before joining the queue and a cost of . for every time step he waits in the queue. At each time step a single agentThyroid-Gland 发表于 2025-3-30 17:47:04
http://reply.papertrans.cn/103/10217/1021686/1021686_53.pngScintigraphy 发表于 2025-3-31 00:09:47
Strategy-Proof Incentives for Predictionsinduce truthfulness. However, when agents have multiple opportunities for revealing information, and take into account long-term effects of their actions, deception and reticence may appear. Such situations have been described in the literature. No simple rules exist to distinguish between the truth充气女 发表于 2025-3-31 02:58:17
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http://reply.papertrans.cn/103/10217/1021686/1021686_56.png遗传 发表于 2025-3-31 10:47:42
Revealed Preference Dimension via Matrix Sign Rankdirected graph. Not all graphs can be constructed as revealed preference graphs when the market dimension is fixed. This paper solves the open problem of determining exactly which graphs are attainable as revealed preference graphs in .-dimensional markets. This is achieved via an exact characteriza出来 发表于 2025-3-31 14:07:25
http://reply.papertrans.cn/103/10217/1021686/1021686_58.png栖息地 发表于 2025-3-31 19:45:14
http://reply.papertrans.cn/103/10217/1021686/1021686_59.pngemission 发表于 2025-3-31 22:14:48
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