声明
发表于 2025-4-1 02:55:34
On Symmetries in Multi-dimensional Mechanism Designantee from worst-case to Bayesian settings, which circumvents strong impossibility results from these works, and then study this guarantee through the lens of symmetries, as any item-symmetric auction is also fair (by this definition). Observe that in this domain, bundling all items together corresp
angiography
发表于 2025-4-1 07:12:32
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Conjuction
发表于 2025-4-1 11:19:30
Welfare-Preserving ,-BIC to BIC Transformation with Negligible Revenue Loss transformation runs a . and a . iteratively to make the mechanism Bayesian incentive compatible. We also analyze .-expected ex-post IC (.-EEIC) mechanisms [.]. We provide a welfare-preserving transformation in this setting with the same revenue loss guarantee for uniform type distributions and give
Cognizance
发表于 2025-4-1 16:59:40
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良心
发表于 2025-4-1 19:27:37
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兵团
发表于 2025-4-1 23:56:50
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Eviction
发表于 2025-4-2 05:05:46
Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness that all of its pure Nash equilibria induce allocations that are . with respect to the underlying true values, while for the algorithm of Plaut and Roughgarden we show that the corresponding allocations not only are . but also satisfy ., something that is not true for this algorithm in the non-stra
喷出
发表于 2025-4-2 10:56:14
Towards a Characterization of Worst Case Equilibria in the Discriminatory Price Auctiondular valuations. We further present an improved upper bound of 4/3 for the special case where there exists a “high” demand bidder. Finally, we also study Bayes-Nash equilibria, and exhibit a separation result that had been elusive so far. Namely, already with two bidders, the Price of Anarchy for B
货物
发表于 2025-4-2 11:50:56
Towards a Characterization of Worst Case Equilibria in the Discriminatory Price Auctiondular valuations. We further present an improved upper bound of 4/3 for the special case where there exists a “high” demand bidder. Finally, we also study Bayes-Nash equilibria, and exhibit a separation result that had been elusive so far. Namely, already with two bidders, the Price of Anarchy for B
组成
发表于 2025-4-2 16:59:58
Improved Analysis of RANKING for Online Vertex-Weighted Bipartite Matching in the Random Order Modelomputationally an upper bound on our approach of 0.6688; any further progress beyond this bound will require either further weakening in the assumptions of . or a stronger analysis than that of Huang et al.